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 1 Introduction
For more than a decade, discussions of U.S. monetary policy have been organized around
variants of the benchmark description advanced by Taylor (1993),
rt =  ½ +  ¼ + c2(¼t ¡  ¼) + c3(yt ¡  yt) + ²r;t; (1)
where r denotes the short-term policy rate controlled by the central bank;  ½ is the natural
rate of the real interest rate; ¼ ¡  ¼ measures the gap between in
ation and the central bank
target for in
ation; and y ¡  y is the log output gap. Although this description was based
on data from 1987-1992, a period that includes the initial ve years of Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC)1 decisions under the Greenspan tenure, variations have been applied to
the behavior of many other central banks and to the historical behavior of the FOMC.
In applying this description to US monetary policy in earlier decades, empirical studies
have suggested modications to one or more arguments of equation (1).2 In particular,
several variations of (1) have been advanced to rationalize the behavior of US monetary
policy in the 1970s.
Calibration exercises can support a large number of possible policy variations in the
1970s. If we assume, for the purpose of discussion, that equation (1) provides an adequate
characterization of the responses of postwar US monetary policy, then the three natural rates
(of output,  yt, in
ation,  ¼, and the real interest rate,  ½) and two parameters of this equation
fully describe the determinants of policy. Under this assumption, signicant dierences in one
or more of these ve arguments during the 1970s must necessarily explain the accommodative
US monetary policy during the Fed chairmanships of Arthur Burns and William Miller.
Indeed, if combinations of variations in the ve arguments are considered, it would not








= 31 possible theories of policy failure during the Great In
ation.3
Among data-based interpretations of US policy in the 1970s, there appear to be two
dominant empirical interpretations of the 1970s: one involving changes in the response
1The FOMC is responsible for the actions of U.S. monetary policy through open market operations.
2A sizeable literature explores regression estimates of US policy responses over postwar samples, including Judd
and Rudebusch (1998), Taylor (1999), Romer and Romer (2002), and Nelson (2005).
3Inconclusive calibration exercises of two competing theories of the Great In
ation are discussed in Collard and
Dellas (2004). Recent surveys of alternative interpretations of US in
ation in the 1970s are presented in Velde (2004)
and Nelson (2005).
1coecients and the other based on alternative characterizations of the central bank
perceptions of natural rates.4
One interpretation has been labelled the passive policy explanation. In the in
uential
work of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), this interpretation is supported by empirical
estimates of the policy rate equation that indicate the estimated policy response of the funds
rate in the 1970s did not keep pace with in
ation.5 One limitation of documented regression
analyses of historical policy responses is that the central bank target for in
ation is assumed
to be invariant and captured in a xed equation intercept. A more subtle identication
problem is raised by Beyer and Farmer (2004) where estimation of reduced form policy
response functions, using only historical realizations of in
ation and output, may be unable
to distinguish between competing dynamic specications of central bank responses and of
other structural relationships in the macro system. Under asymmetric information, this
source of ambiguity can be mitigated by using prior information on the structure of central
bank forecast models and by tting policy responses to the central bank historical forecasts.
The other leading explanation of the Great In
ation is the natural rate error
interpretation. In a series of important papers, Orphanides (2003a, 2003b, forthcoming)
suggests policy responses in the 1970s to in
ation and the output gap, such as c2 and c3 in
equation (1), were consistent with stable policy responses. However, lower levels of the policy
rate were induced by substantial and persistent overestimation by the central bank of the
natural rate for output,  yt. Although this research has instigated useful work on consequences
of real-time errors in estimates of the natural rate of output and trend productivity, the
applicability to policy formation in the 1970s is conjectural. A major obstacle to conrming
this interpretation of monetary policy in the 1970s is the lack of a continuous historical
record of central bank estimates of the natural rate for output. In the absence of historical
4A third notable interpretation is that the Fed attempted to exploit a perceived permanent tradeo between
unemployment and in
ation, as in Sargent (1999) and Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2004). This conjecture is not
supported by central bank real-time implementations of the Phillips curve in the 1970s, as in Enzler and Pierce (1974)
which assumed the absence of a long-run tradeo. Notwithstanding, Cogley and Sargent (2005) ingeniously suggest
policy may have optimized a collection of competing macro models, including the permanent tradeo specication,
where a subset of models (with low posterior odds) predict innite costs for disin
ations in the 1970s.
5In terms of equation (1), the passivity of policy is summarized by the inequality, ^ c2 < 1. Analytical determinacy
conditions for a variety of interest rate response formats are explored in Woodford (2003). In the absence of a stable
policy response to in
ation, Clarida et al. (2000) suggest that private sector expectations of in
ation in the 1970s
may have been driven by non-fundamental (sunspot) shocks. However, using the model suggested by Clarida et al.
(2000) for the 1970s, Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) demonstrate that neither fundamental nor sunspot RE equilibria
were accessible to agents using adaptive learning.
2brieng estimates of  yt by the central bank, Orphanides (2003a) uses output natural rates
presented in annual reports of the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) as a real-time proxy.
However, given representative specications of aggregate pricing equations in the 1970s, it
is more likely that the FOMC used aggregate unemployment to gauge real resource slack.6
Curiously, there appears to be little empirical work to recover the implied in
ation target
of the US central bank,  ¼t. This paper will draw on the history of forecasts presented to
the FOMC to estimate the evolution of the policy response function and movements in the
implied in
ation target.7 An important dierence from prior studies is that the eective
in
ation target is not treated as implicit in xed intercepts or assumed to be a known
constant. The empirical results generally support the passive policy theory of Clarida et
al. (2000). However, the results suggest also an alternative interpretation that provides
additional insights into the design of US monetary policy in the 1970s.
Section 2 discusses estimates of the in
ation target implied by historical policy responses
to Greenbook forecasts. The empirical results suggest a reconsideration of policy responses
in the 1970s. Consequently, section 3 explores an alternative description of US monetary
policy in that period. Section 4 concludes.
6CEA natural rate estimates are infrequently cited in the FOMC Memorandum of Discussion (MOD) during
the 1970s, and do not appear to have been supported by sta forecasts. Examples include: \(T)he potential GNP
as estimated by the Council of Economic Advisers is based on a 3.8 per cent unemployment rate. That may well
be too low an unemployment target for sustainable economic growth without in
ation," Partee, FOMC Economist
(MOD, 11/17/1970, p.31) and \Mr. Partee observed that the target for the unemployment rate referred to in
the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers already seemed to have been increased from 4 to 4-1/2
percent....according to the (Greenbook) projections, even a 5 per cent unemployment rate would be associated with
considerable continuing in
ation in the short run." (MOD, 3/19/1973, p.28). Sta estimates of the \high-employment
scal surplus or decit" are reported in Greenbook forecasts since April 1970 to measure changes in discretionary
scal policy, based on the methodology suggested in Okun and Teeters (1970), but estimates of high-employment
GNP are not recorded in 1970s Greenbook forecasts or used to gauge in
ationary pressure.
7Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) presents constructions of central bank real-time perceptions of the natural rate of
unemployment. Note that the estimated in
ation target is an eective target, implied by the structure of the policy
response function. Of course, the estimate may not correspond to the intentions of policy-makers. Although an
individual decision-maker may maintain an invariant preference distribution over the domain of policy objectives, the
historical record of FOMC discussions suggests dierences in preference distributions among members of the FOMC.
Because US monetary policy is determined by a twelve-member subset of the FOMC, rotations of voting eligibility
and of tenure on the FOMC, as well as variations in framing voting choices, vid. Arrow (1951), imply that the
eective target for in
ation selected by the central bank will likely vary over time.
32 Historical policy responses and estimates of the eective
in
ation target
This section discusses implicit estimates of the central bank target for in
ation,  ¼t, from
time-varying descriptions of the policy response to recent and projected developments in
macro indicators. Real-time data on macro indicators are obtained from central bank brieng
documents (Greenbooks) prepared in advance of FOMC meetings.
Policy responses are estimated for a full sample, January 1969 through December 1997,
and for two subsamples that combine the tenures of Arthur Burns and G. William Miller as
chairmen of the FOMC, February 1970 through July 1979, and tenures of Paul Volcker and
Alan Greenspan, August 1979 through December 1997.
Implied estimates of  ¼t from time-varying policy response equations
Under asymmetric information, the private sector perception of the central bank target for
in
ation plays a major role in anchoring forward expectations of in
ation, which appear
in both the pricing equations of rms and the forward policy rate perceptions of traders
in nancial asset markets. However, the true central bank target for in
ation explicitly
appears only in the description of policy rate responses, such as equation (1). Consequently,
estimation in this section uses the policy response function to identify variations in the
eective policy target for in
ation.
The following description of FOMC policy responses is explored where, as noted earlier,
the unemployment gap provides a plausible indicator of historical policy objectives regarding
economic slack. In the absence of policy rate smoothing, the desired setting of the federal
funds rate at the FOMC meeting in period tf is the forward-looking specication
r
¤
tf =  ½t +  ¼t + c2;t(¼
k
tjtg ¡  ¼t) + c3;t(ut+kjtg ¡  ut) + c4;tutjtg; (2)
where the subscript tg denotes the date of the relevant Greenbook forecast, tf the date of
the FOMC meeting, tf > tg, and, generally, both are contained in the current quarter, t.
The in
ation and unemployment regressors on the rhs of equation (2) are drawn from the
Greenbook in period tg. The in
ation measure, ¼k
tjtg, is a four-quarter average of forecasts up
to quarter t + k in the forecast horizon and may also include Greenbook estimates of recent
in
ation, and ut+kjtg is the Greenbook forecast of the unemployment rate in quarter t + k.
The desired policy rate may also be a function of the projected change in the unemployment
4rate, utjtg. This addition approximately nests several alternative specications of FOMC
policy responses.8
Dynamic adjustments of the funds rate are represented by
rtf = ¯5;trtf¡1 + (1 ¡ ¯6;t)r
¤
tf + ¯6;trtf¡1 + atf; (3)
which contains a term capturing any continuation of the policy rate change selected in the
last Greenbook; a partial adjustment of the funds rate level to the desired setting; and an
i.i.d. stochastic shock, atf. Combining equations (2) and (3) gives
rtf = ¯1;t + ¯2;t¼
k
tjtg + ¯3;t(ut+kjtg ¡  utjtg) + ¯4;tutjtg
+¯5;trtf¡1 + ¯6;t(rtf¡1 ¡  ½t) +  ½t + atf: (4)
To identify the central bank eective target for in
ation, the Greenbook perception of the
natural rate of unemployment,  ut, is drawn from Kozicki and Tinsley (2005); subsample
averages of  ut are shown in the last column of Table 1.9 The natural rate of the real policy
rate,  ½t, is approximated by an HP lter of the historical funds rate less the Greenbook
forecast of in
ation, r ¡ ¼.10 Under these assumptions, the central bank target for in
ation
implied by equation (4) is  ¼t = ¡¯1;t=(¯2;t + ¯6;t ¡ 1).
The policy rate on the lhs of equation (4) is the average of federal funds rates in the
interval following the FOMC meeting in tf to the next meeting in tf +1. The lagged policy
rate regressor, rtf¡1, is the average funds rate since the previous FOMC meeting.11
Data description and time-varying parameter (tvp) specications
Other than the policy rate, all data are drawn from historical Greenbooks. The Greenbook
is a sta brieng document presented to FOMC members before a policy meeting of the
8Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Lansing (2002) suggest FOMC policies after the 1970s placed a greater emphasis
on the change in output.
9The remaining columns of Table 1 are discussed below.
10Following Ravn and Uhlig (2002), the Hodrick-Prescott smoothing parameter is 2
4 x 1600 = 25;600, as the
FOMC has met at least eight times a year during the sample used. The average of the natural rate construction is
2.6 over the full sample, with  ½t falling below the average value in the mid-1970s and rising above the average in the
rst half of the 1980s. The principal eect of alternative natural real rate measures is to alter the implied estimate
of the central bank target for in
ation. Denoting ± ½t as the deviation of the natural real rate from a constant,
the time-varying adjustment to the implied estimate of target in
ation is
± ½t
c2;t¡1, where the sign of the adjustment
depends on the stability of the long-run response to in
ation, c2;t.
11As FOMC dates are not evenly spaced over the calendar, the number of days in the funds rate averages will vary
but time-varying parameters may partially compensate for this. Fixed-coecient regressions of meeting-to-meeting
adjustments of the funds rate are explored in Froyen and Waud (2002).
5FOMC. Part II contains background analyses of recent economic and nancial data, and
Part I presents the sta multiperiod forecast of economic activity. The baseline Greenbook
forecast is a \judgemental" forecast. Components of the forecast are selected in a series of
meetings by the senior sta and sectoral specialists, who prepare initial projections for their
area of expertise.
The baseline Greenbook forecast is considered the modal, or most-likely, outcome, given
recent policy decisions and objectives. Forecast assumptions conditioned on perceived
current policy and objectives include the senior sta's judgement of likely outcomes in
nancial markets over the forecast horizon.
Because Greenbook forecasts are constructed on the basis of assumptions about current
and future policy, in principle, it would be desirable to incorporate information also about
expected future policy rates. However, as of mid-2005, Greenbook forecast assumptions
about future policy rates over the forecast horizon are not publicly available. To facilitate
some smoothing of estimates and reporting at a xed frequency, data associated with
Greenbook dates falling in the same quarter, t, are stacked in the relevant observation
vectors and matrices for quarter t. To simplify subscript notation, the FOMC and Greenbook
conditioning dates, tf and tg, are generally suppressed in the remaining discussion.
As reviewed in the appendix, three specications are used to capture time-variation in
the coecients of the policy response equation. One, the random walk intercept specication,
assumes time-variation in the implied in
ation target is represented by a random walk of
the intercept, ¯1;t. However, as noted above, extraction of the implied in
ation target also
depends on ¯2;t and ¯6;t, and modest variations in these coecients may lead to large changes
in the constructed in
ation target,  ¼t. Consequently, a second specication, random walk
coecients extends the random walk specication to the remaining unrestricted coecients
of the policy response function. While tractable, random walk specications have some
questionable implications, including assumptions that all parameter change is permanent
and that parameters can evolve over time without nite bounds. Consequently, a third
specication, stationary coecients, assumes time-variation in all unrestricted coecients
can be captured by autoregressive movements about xed means.
After examining a number of time-varying parameter (tvp) applications, our experience
is that the means of the coecients, the maximum and minimum of the implied in
ation
6targets, and the variance decomposition for the stationary coecients estimate (see
appendix) provide useful summary contrasts among alternative specications. Where
relevant, these statistics are shown in the tables that follow for the three tvp specications:
the random walk intercept (RWI) model; the random walk coecients (RWC) format; and
the stationary coecients (SC) specication.
Full-sample results, 1969-1997
The horizon of forward expectations, k, in historical Greenbooks is limited in early years
of the sample. In Table 2, in
ation is averaged over four quarters, including Greenbook
estimates of in
ation in the two preceding quarters, h = ¡2;¡1, and the in
ation forecasts
for the current and next quarter in the policy horizon, h = 0;1.12
Using the two-quarter lead, k = 1, the policy equation (4) is estimated by the three tvp
specications over a 1969 - 1997 sample containing 280 Greenbooks.13 The tvp specications
accommodate two shifts in the variance of the measurement error, ¾a, to account for the
change in operating procedures from 1979Q4 to 1982Q3.14
The top panel of Table 2 uses  ut, the natural rate of unemployment implied by
Greenbooks, discussed in Kozicki and Tinsley (2005). The bottom panel uses  ub
t, an
alternative Greenbook-based estimate of the natural rate of unemployment that is closer to
that reported by Romer and Romer (2002). Dierences between the two Greenbook-based
estimates of the unemployment natural rate are illustrated in Table 1, which compares
subsample averages of the two estimates with averages reported in Romer and Romer (2002)
and with averages of the retrospective construction by the Congressional Budget Oce
(2004). Both the Romer and Romer estimates and  ub
t are based on a Phillips equation with
12Although both Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2000) and Orphanides (forthcoming) estimate forward-looking policy rules,
a number of studies including Taylor (1999) have estimated policy responses to backward-looking averages. As both
recent measurements and forecasts of in
ation can be subject to sizeable revisions over time, it seems plausible that
FOMC members may dier in the emphasis placed on forecasts or recent measurements in weighing their policy
decisions. Policy equations were also estimated for two-quarter averages, h = 0;1 with estimation results similar to
those in Table 2. In the case of the stationary coecients specications, likelihood ratios prefer the use of four-quarter
averages for the in
ation rate, and four-quarter averages are used in subsequent tables.
13The Greenbook of November 15, 1972 contains only a current-quarter forecast, i.e. the Greenbook forecast
horizon, H, in that quarter is equal to the rst period of the forecast, h = 0. For this Greenbook, the current-quarter
forecast is repeated when a two-quarter forecast horizon is required, as for k = 1.
14The use of a nonborrowed reserves instrument during the 1979-82 interval increased the eective variance of at
by introducing shocks from money demand and the banking reserves market, vid.Tinsley, von zur Muehlen, and Fries
(1982). In the case of random-walk specications of the FOMC policy response rule, a mid-sample changepoint test
estimates the local-to-zero parameter as ¸ = 11:1 (see discussion and references to the median unbiased estimator in
the appendix).
7backwards-looking in
ation expectations, and imply substantial real-time underestimates
of the CBO retrospective measure in the rst half of the 1970s, of 2-3 percentage points
(a 30-50% error). By contrast, the retrospective underestimation by  ut is less than one
percentage point in the rst half of the 1970s (a 17% error). The  ut estimate is based on
a \hybrid" Phillips curve, with both forward- and backwards-looking in
ation expectations,
vid Kozicki and Tinsley (2005).15
In both panels of Table 2, the maximum and minimum bounds of the implied central
bank target for in
ation,  ¼t, are large, suggesting diculty in identifying  ¼t over part of the
sample. The variance decomposition indicates a substantial source of stochastic variation in
the policy rate is due to time-varying movements in the response to in
ation, ¯2;t.16 This
suggests that estimated variations in the policy response to in
ation may be contributing to
the implausible movements of the implied in
ation target.
Estimates of the long-run policy responses to in
ation, c2;t, from the three tvp
specications in the top panel of Table 2 are charted in Figure 1. In the case of the xed-slope
specication, RWI, the long-run response to in
ation is stable but close to unity, c2 = 1:1. For
the RWC and SC specications, the estimated long-run responses are substantially greater
than one for much of the sample, but large estimates of the central bank in
ation target,  ¼t,
occur when c2;t enters the neighborhood of unity. As shown in Figure 1, there are two unit
crossings by c2;t in the 1970s for the SC specication and an additional unit crossing in the
1990s for the RWC specication.
Previous studies, such as Orphanides (2002, forthcoming), have suggested that the policy
response equation exhibits stable responses to in
ation, c2 > 1, when real-time estimates of
the natural rate of real activity are used in the policy regression. The lower panel of Table
2 uses the natural rate of unemployment,  ub
t, that represents an upper bound on real-time
measurement errors of the natural rate implied by Greenbook forecasts. However, even with
the larger unemployment gaps associated with  ub
t, the problem of implausible lower and
upper bounds on the eective target for in
ation persists in the lower panel of Table 2 due
15Interestingly, the  ut natural rate estimate of 5.6, shown in Table 1 for  ut in the 1996Q1-97Q4 interval, is precisely
the natural rate of unemployment assumed in the February 1997 Greenbook, as reported in Svensson and Tetlow
(2005)
16Steady-state variance decompositions of the separate contributions of individual time-varying coecients,
weighted by the relevant regressors, are available only for the stationary coecients (SC) specication. Construction
of the decomposition is reviewed in the appendix.
8to unit crossings of the response to in
ation, c2;t, in the 1970s and 1990s.
Tests for structural changes in the coecients of the policy equation indicate a major
shift at the end of the 1970s.17 Consequently, as neither adjustments for shifts in the
variance of the measurement error of the policy response equation, ¾2
a, nor an alternative
construction of the natural rate for unemployment,  ub
t, are sucient to explain the policy
transition, the remainder of this section explores estimations of separate policy responses for
the Burns/Miller and the Volcker/Greenspan tenures.
Policy during the Burns/Miller tenures
Results of tting equation (4) to Greenbook forecasts in the Burns/Miller era are presented
in the top panel of Table 3. The policy regime, 1970Q1 through 1979Q2, spans 38 quarters
and 115 Greenbooks. In the top panel of Table 3, mean responses to both in
ation and
the rst-dierence of unemployment are statistically signicant.18 The mean response to the
unemployment gap, ut+1 ¡  ut, is marginally signicant, with p-values of .09 for the RWI
specication and .11 for the SC specication. However, the lower bounds for the implied
natural rate of in
ation are negative for all three tvp specications.
Fixed coecient regression studies of US monetary policy generally indicate that policy
in the 1970s responded signicantly to gap measures of real activity.19 In exploring this
suggestion, the second panel in Table 3 drops the unemployment change regressor and the
third panel eliminates the unemployment gap regressor.
When the rst-dierence of the unemployment rate is dropped as a regressor in the middle
panel of Table 3, mean policy responses to the unemployment gap,  ¯3, are insignicant,
with p-values around .20. By contrast, mean policy responses to the rst-dierence of the
unemployment rate in the bottom panel of Table 3 are signicant, as are the mean responses
to in
ation.20
17The test statistics are robust to residual heteroskedasticity. The largest test statistics occur in early 1980 with
zero p-values, using the tables in Hansen (1997).
18Examining the signicance of the mean policy responses to in
ation and the two unemployment measures are
meaningful as there are no zero crossings by the tvp coecients on these regressors in the remaining sections of the
paper.
19Signicant mean responses to output gaps in the 1970s are reported in Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Taylor
(1999), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Nelson (2005), and Orphanides (forthcoming).
20In addition to the statistical insignicance of mean policy responses to the unemployment gap,  ¯3, a Chi-squared
test of the likelihoods of the SC equations in the top and bottom panels of Table 3 does not reject zero restrictions
on the additional parameters required for a tvp policy response to the unemployment gap.
9In all three panels of Table 3, the upper bounds for the implied central bank target for
in
ation,  ¼t, are large for the random walk coecients specication, RWC. The principal
reason is that the estimated long-run response to in
ation, c2;t, either remains in the
neighborhood of unity or exhibits a unit crossing. Figure 2 charts estimates of c2;t for
the three tvp policy rules of the bottom panel in Table 3. The long-run policy response to
in
ation remains below unity for both the RWI and SC policy equations, but c2;t has a unit
crossing in 1972 for the RWC policy equation. In addition, the estimated long-run response
to in
ation falls in 1974 for both the RWC and SC equations.
Recalling the two leading interpretations of US policy in the 1970s, the evidence of
the tvp specications presented in this section supports the passive policy interpretation.
Indeed, the natural rate error explanation appears to be largely irrelevant, as there is
little empirical support for a systematic policy response to the unemployment gap.21 An
alternative interpretation of US policy in the 1970s is explored in section 3.
Policy during the Volcker/Greenspan tenures
The policy equation (4) is estimated for the Volcker/Greenspan policy era, 1979Q3 through
1997Q4, a span of 75 quarters and 152 Greenbooks.22 Estimates of the three tvp
specications are summarized in Table 4.
The construction of the in
ation regressor, ¼k
t , varies in the two panels of Table 4.
In
ation is averaged over the rst two quarters of the Greenbook horizon and the two
preceding quarters in the top panel, h = ¡2;¡1;0;1. In addition, given the availability
of longer Greenbook forecast horizons in the Volcker/Greenspan sample, the four-quarter
in
ation average is shifted ahead by two quarters in the bottom panel, h = 0;1;2;3.
The estimated mean policy responses to all regressors, including both the unemployment
gap and the rst-dierence in unemployment, are generally statistically signicant in Table
4. The lower bound of the implied in
ation target,  ¼t, is negative for the random walk
21The absence of a policy response to unemployment gaps also casts doubt on interpretations of 1970s US monetary
policy based on a dierence between the natural rate of unemployment and a central bank target for unemployment,
such as posited in the time inconsistency literature or the central bank misperception analysis of Sargent, Williams,
and Zha (2004).
22Fixed-coecient residuals, ut, exhibit less volatility in the Volcker/Greenspan sample than in the Burns/Miller
sample. The estimate of the local-to-zero parameter for median unbiased estimators for the Volcker/Greenspan sample
is lowered to ¸ = 6:9, a result consistent with a mid-sample changepoint test for the Volcker/Greenspan observations.
Estimated outcomes in the Burns/Miller sample, such as statistical insignicance of mean policy responses to the
unemployment gap, are maintained if the lower local-to-zero parameter is used also for the 1970s.
10coecients, RWC, equations in both panels. As with the policy equations estimated for
the Burns/Miller sample, these negative bounds are due to unit crossings of the estimated
long-run policy response to in
ation, c2;t. Figure 3 displays estimates of the policy response
to in
ation for the three tvp specications of the top panel. The c2;t response estimate by
the SC equation is smaller in the early 1990s but remains above one throughout the sample,
whereas the response by the random walk coecients, RWC, equation continues to drop and
falls below one in 1994.
The estimated characteristics of the stationary coecients specication, SC, are similar in
both panels of Table 4. A likelihood ratio suggests a slight advantage for the specication in
the top panel where the four-quarter average of in
ation, ¼k
t , contains both forward forecasts
and backward real-time estimates, h = ¡2;¡1;0;1.23 The time prole of the central bank
target for in
ation,  ¼t, in the Volcker/Greenspan sample is shown in Figure 4, as implied
by the SC equation in the top panel of Table 4. The remaining variables in Figure 4 are
discussed in the next section.
3 An alternative interpretation of policy in the 1970s
\If you can remember anything about the sixties (and seventies), you weren't really there"
- Paul Kantner
Simple policy response equations that relate movements of the policy interest rate, r, to
changes in arguments of the central bank preference function, such as in
ation, ¼, and real
economic activity, y or y, are the basis of many useful empirical descriptions of historical
monetary policy. However, positing a direct link between the policy instrument and ultimate
policy objectives conceals a major 
aw in the design of monetary policy in the 1970s. This
section indicates that intermediate targeting of monetary aggregates{a monetarist strategy
that dominated FOMC policy in the 1970s{provides a unied interpretation of the Great
In
ation, explaining the irrelevance of the natural rate error interpretation and providing a
more historically accurate description of policy design in the 1970s.
The gathering in
uence of monetarism on US monetary policy
23Several papers demonstrate that indeterminacy may occur if policy responds to arguments in distant forecasts;
see the numerical analysis in Batini and Pearlman (2002).
11In a collection of highly in
uential essays, Milton Friedman (1960) indicated that \I share
the doubts that the Federal Reserve has repeatedly expressed about the desirability of using
price level stability as an intermediate guide to policy." Instead, he proposed that the
central bank pursue constant growth of the money stock. In 1960, a unied measure of
the money supply was published in the October Federal Reserve Bulletin. In the June 1966
FOMC meeting, the FOMC Policy Directive to the trading desk of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York contained the rst \proviso" reference to the required reserves aggregate as a
secondary target. Finally, in the second FOMC meeting chaired by Arthur Burns, the Policy
Directive adopted at the March 10, 1970 meeting selected the growth of monetary aggregates
as principal targets of US monetary policy.
Policy forecasting and FOMC policy discussions in the 1970s were shaped by the two-stage
design that is characteristic of intermediate targeting. Greenbook forecasts of economic
activity were conditioned on the assumption of a trajectory for the money supply over the
forecast horizon, vid.Kalchbrenner and Tinsley (1977).24 As noted earlier, to assist sectoral
specialists, the senior sta translated the money supply assumption into sta expectations
of bond yields over the forecast horizon.
By contrast, short-run policy options were formulated as competing money growth paths
associated with alternative settings of the policy instrument, usually the funds rate. In
principle, the competing options for the money supply represented dierent short-run paths
toward the baseline money supply trajectory assumed in the Greenbook. These short-run
policy options were presented in the Blue Book. Each Blue Book contained a brief summary
of recent activity in money and banking markets and suggested, generally, three policy
options for discussion by the FOMC.25 Forecasts of money growth associated with alternative
24Generally, the monetary policy assumption of the Greenbook forecast was the M1 growth rate target selected at
the last FOMC meeting. For example: \That growth rate of money (4%) had been assumed for projection purposes
because the Committee had been employing such a rate as a target over the past several months." Partee, FOMC
Economist (MOD, 6/23/70, p.31); and \In developing our base projection, which is laid out in detail in the green
book, we have adopted several policy assumptions. The monetary policy assumption calls for a continuation of the
present policy stance through 1976, as indexed by the growth in the narrow money supply at around the 6-1/4 per
cent midpoint of the range that has been announced by the Committee." Partee (MOD 6/16/75, p.4).
25Two examples of sta interpretations of the Bluebook policy options are: \Mr. Axilrod observed that among
the alternative sets of relationships between monetary aggregates and money market conditions presented in each
blue book, there was always one that represented a continuation of the Committee's current longer-run target for
the aggregates. There was always another alternative that represented a continuation of prevailing money market
conditions." (MOD, 11/20/72, p.52); and \Mr. Partee said it might be helpful if he explained how the sta proceeded
in formulating the blue book alternatives. One of the alternatives always shown involved the maintenance of prevailing
money market conditions; in the present case, that was alternative C, the tightest of the three. Another alternative
12policy rate settings appear in the Blue Book presented at the rst FOMC meeting chaired by
Arthur Burns on February 10, 1970. Although alternative forecasts of the money supply were
initially limited to the current quarter, as in the February 4 Bluebook, or also included the
next quarter ahead, as in the March 4 Bluebook, horizons of the Bluebook conditional money
supply forecasts were eventually lengthened to four-quarter horizons in 1975, including the
current quarter, h = 0;1;2;3.
Empirical evidence for intermediate targeting in the Burns/Miller era
Intermediate targeting of the money supply is summarized by three equations,
mt = ¼t + yt ¡ vt; (5)
 mt =  ¼t +  yt ¡  vt; (6)
r
¤
tf =  ½t +  ¼t + c2;t(mt ¡  mt + (vt ¡  vt)); (7)
where equation (5) is the monetarist equation of exchange that links Greenbook forecasts of
in
ation and output growth to the projected growth of the monetary aggregate. Equation
(6) is a natural rate variant that indicates what target growth of the monetary aggregate is
consistent with the natural rates for in
ation and output growth. The desired setting of the
funds rate at the FOMC meeting in period tf is dened by equation (7). This is an adjusted
variant of intermediate targeting, where monetary aggregate growth is adjusted for the sta
prediction of transient velocity growth, vt ¡  vt.26
always shown involved the longer-run growth rate for M1 adopted by the Committee at its previous meeting. Since
on this occasion that alternative called for a rather sizeable near-term decline in the Federal funds rate followed by an
upturn before the end of the 6-month projection period, the sta thought it probably would be as liberal a policy as
the committee was likely to consider within the range of reasonableness. Consequently, that alternative was labeled
"A," and the third was formulated to fall between the other two." (MOD, 1/21/75, pp. 61-2).
26By construction, a persistent shift in trend velocity alters the natural rate estimate,  vt. \Shift-adjusted"'
monetary aggregate targets, to account for the estimated eects of nancial innovations such as the nationwide
introduction of negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts, were not publicly announced until 1981. The
transient velocity growth adjustment, vt ¡ vt, of equation (7) approximates the \zone of indierence" the FOMC
adopted in the 1970s to accommodate transient movements within growth rate target ranges. The evolution of the
\zone of indierence" is illustrated by the following selections from the Memorandum of Discussion: "On balance he
would not object to some shading of the funds rate if the aggregate growth rates appeared to be close to the upper
or lower limits. However, more vigorous action should be taken only if the growth rates appeared to be outside the
range." Burns, (MOD 10/17/72, p.40). "Chairman Burns remarked at the last meeting he had initially dened the
ranges for the aggregates as zones of no action. He had then modied that{in response to Mr. Holmes' remarks{to
provide for a movement in the funds rate of up to but no more than 1/8 of 1 percentage point as the aggregates
approached their limits. In the event that the aggregates appeared to be moving beyond their limits, however, full and
free use was to be made of the range for the funds rate." (MOD, 11/20/72 p. 50). \(Governor Partee's) preference
was for (a range) of 4 to 8...for M-1...with a zone of indierence of 5 to 7....Chairman Burns observed that he could
accept the zones of indierence proposed by Mr. Partee." (MOD, 3/16/76, p.74).
13Substituting the rst two equations, (5) and (6), into the third equation (7), gives the
desired funds rate explicitly conditioned on averages of Greenbook forecasts,
r
¤
tf =  ½t +  ¼t + c2;t((¼
k
t ¡  ¼t) + (y
k
t ¡  yt));
=  ½t +  ¼t + c2;t(x
k
t ¡  xt); (8)
where xk
t ¡  xt is a proxy for the gap of nominal output growth using Okun's Law, xk
t ¡  xt =
¼k
t ¡  ¼t ¡ a0uk
t;27 and the superscript, k, indicates four-quarter averaging over forecast
periods through h = k.
Note that equation (8) is a restricted version of the desired funds rate equation specied
earlier in (2). Three restrictions are required by money growth intermediate targeting: First,
the policy response to the unemployment gap is zero, c3;t = 0. Second, the dierence in the
unemployment rate, uk
t, is averaged over the same number of periods as the in
ation
rate regressor. Third, the long-run policy responses to the in
ation average, ¼k
t , and the
average of the unemployment rate dierence proxy, ¡a0uk
t, are the same, c2;t. The dynamic
adjustment of the funds rate is the same as that specied earlier in equation (3).
Time-varying estimates of the policy rate response equation implied by money growth
intermediate targeting are presented in Table 5. Equations in the bottom panel are estimates
of the policy response equation when all three restrictions associated with intermediate
targeting of the money growth are imposed. The unemployment gap regressor, ut+k ¡  ut,
is added to equations in the top panel of Table 5. Similar to the results in section 2, the
estimated mean policy responses to the unemployment gap,  ¯3, are statistically insignicant.
In addition, the average dierence in the unemployment rate, uk
t, is added to the equations
reported in the middle panel of Table 5. These equations also indicate that the mean policy
response of the Burns/Miller sample to the dierence in the unemployment rate does not
dier signicantly from the response expected under money growth intermediate targeting.
Although not shown, the estimated long-run policy responses, c2;t, to the nominal growth
proxies, xt, implied by the tvp specications in the bottom panel of Table 5 move between
0.5 and 0.7 during the 1970s. Thus, the implied long-run responses to in
ation are even
further below one than those estimated in section 2 for the Burns/Miller sample.
Finally, dierences between the central bank target for in
ation implied by Greenbook
27The Okun's Law coecient, a
0 = 2:2, is based on estimates for the 1970s in Tatom (1977).




t, are charted in Figure 4. The two thick lines are estimates of  ¼t for the Burns/Miller era
from 1970Q1 through 1979Q2 (from the SC specication in the bottom panel of Table 5), and
for the Volcker/Greenspan sample from 1979Q3 through 1997Q4 (from the SC specication
in the top panel of Table 4). The thick dashed line is a concatenation of real-time survey
estimates of long-term in
ation expectations by private agents.28 The thin line is an estimate




Kozicki and Tinsley (2001).29
Using the vertical distance between the private perception,  ¼
p
t, and the central bank target
for in
ation,  ¼t, as a measure of the credibility of the US central bank, Figure 4 suggests
that credibility was positive and large at the beginning of the 1970s and steadily evaporated
over the decade. By the beginning of the 1980s, the gap in credibility was negative and quite
large, about ve percentage points, and only slowly returned to a value near zero by the end
of the sample.
Consequences of money growth intermediate targeting
The most striking outcomes of the tvp specications of policy in the 1970s are the rather
high estimates of the central bank target for in
ation,  ¼t, and the uniformly low estimates
of the long-run policy responses, c2;t.
A monetary policy that targets the growth rate of the money supply is vulnerable to two
types of fundamental shocks, and both occurred in the 1970s. Renormalizing equation (6),
the eective central bank target for in
ation under intermediate targeting is dened by
 ¼t =  mt ¡  yt +  vt: (9)
Given a target growth rate for the money supply,  mt, the eective in
ation target is
increased if the central bank is unable to detect a reduction in the natural rate trend of
output,  yt, or an increase in trend velocity,  vt. The natural rate of trend output growth
28Until July 1990, survey estimates are drawn from the Hoey survey of expected in
ation in the second ve years of
a 10-year forecast horizon. The remainder of the series is long-run expected in
ation from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters, published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
29This estimate is based on multinomial logit aggregation of alternative changepoint estimators of  ¼t. Although this
estimate of perceived long-run in
ation is similar to the survey of long-term expected in
ation, survey information
was not used in the estimated learning model of private sector perceptions.
15slowed in the late 1960s and early 1970s.30 Subsequently, due to nancial innovations fuelled
by higher in
ation and deregulation of banking and nancial markets, the trend of velocity
began a long march of upward shifts in the mid-1970s. Both an unexpected reduction in  y
and unexpected increases in  v induced a higher eective central bank target for in
ation
in the 1970s under money supply intermediate targeting.
Note that the policy errors caused by erroneous predictions of trend velocity are unique
to a policy based on money supply intermediate targeting. The unpredicted shift in trend
velocity was not small. The December 12, 1980 Bluebook contains an analysis of money
demand models. Conditioned on retrospective measurements of explanatory variables, the
annual underestimate of velocity growth over the last half of the 1970s by the 1980 vintage
of the sta model was 1.8 percentage points, including errors of 5.1 percentage points in
1975 and 2.9 percentage points in 1976.31
The second unusual characteristic of policy in the 1970s is that the estimated long-run
policy response to the money supply growth proxy, c2;t, remained well below one in the
Burns/Miller sample.
Contemporaneous critiques of money growth targeting in the 1970s included criticism
of the relatively tight FOMC ranges on inter-meeting variations of the policy rate, vid.
Poole (1975). The inter-meeting tolerance ranges on the policy rate are charted in Figure
5. It is evident that tight inter-meeting ranges did not prevent sizeable meeting-to-meeting
adjustments of the policy rate in 1973 and 1974. By contrast, FOMC decisions led to 
at
or modest meeting-to-meeting adjustments of the policy rate level after 1974, until the large
upward adjustments of the policy rate in the initial FOMC meetings chaired by Paul Volcker
after October 1979 (not shown).
The passivity of policy through much of the second-half of the 1970s is also illustrated
in Figure 6 where the policy rate is plotted against the Greenbook prediction of the





xt+h. Even if velocity had
been perfectly predicted, variations of the funds rate did not keep pace with Greenbook
predicted movements of nominal growth during most of the 1970s.
30See a literature review of estimated shifts in trend productivity in Bullard and Duy (2004).
31Goldfeld (1976) indicates that a representative money demand model of the early 1970s generates larger prediction
errors, with an out-of-sample RMSE of 6.3 percentage points from 1974Q1 to 1975Q2.
16One interpretation of the 1970s is that the FOMC did not believe it had popular support
for large increases in the policy rate, vid.DeLong (1997) and Meltzer (2005). This explanation
is not consistent with policy actions in mid-1974, when the funds rate was driven near 13%,
nor with discussion in the FOMC Memorandum of Discussion:
\Chairman Burns said he might oer his appraisal of the existing support for current
Federal Reserve policy. He agreed that support in Congress was strong; he had been
receiving almost no critical mail from that source. Of the letters that reached his
desk from individuals across the country, a majority were still commendatory." (MOD,
6/18/74, p.62).
"More generally, in his many recent conversations with Congressman he had found
widespread acceptance of the need for slow economic growth: they reported their
constituents were more anxious about in
ation than unemployment." Burns (MOD,
7/16/74, p.34)32
Another possible interpretation is that the FOMC may have become disenchanted with
intermediate targeting of the monetary aggregates in the mid-1970s. The role of intermediate
targets in operational policy was reviewed in the Stage II report of the Subcommittee on
the Directive (1976) distributed to FOMC members in early 1976.33 The initial portion
of this report reviewed a sta proposal that the policy instrument, such as the funds rate
or nonborrowed reserves, directly target ultimate objectives, such as unemployment and
in
ation, relegating the money supply to one of many potential indicators of unobserved
movements in ultimate objectives. However, the remainder of the report endorsed the
two-stage strategy of intermediate targeting with monetary aggregates. FOMC discussion
of this report in the 3/15/76 meeting supported a continuation of intermediate targeting:
"Mr. Wallich added that if optimal control were applied to monetary policy it would
tend to focus attention on such ultimate objectives as full employment and price
32It might be noted that these real-time quotes dier considerably from the retrospective Per Jacobsson Lecture,
often cited by policy historians, where Burns (1979) suggests: \As the Federal Reserve, for example, kept testing and
probing the limits of its freedom to undernourish the in
ation, it repeatedly evoked violent criticism from both the
Executive Branch and the Congress."
33The Subcommittee was chaired by Governor Holland, with Governor Wallich, President Balles (Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco), and President Morris (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston) as members.
17stability. However, he had strongly endorsed the Subcommittee's recommendation that
monetary policy continue to focus primarily on intermediate objectives, rather than on
ultimate objectives....In further discussion individual members of the Subcommittee
commented on the reasons why they had not favored directly relating an operational
instrument, such as nonborrowed reserves or the federal funds rate, to ultimate
objectives. These reasons included the diculty of linking instrumental variables to
ultimate objectives, both intuitively or through use of econometric models; the problem
of reaching an agreement on necessary tradeos among ultimate objectives; and the
complications created by the fact that monetary policy was but one of many in
uences
on the ultimate objectives." (MOD, 3/15/76, p.16)
The FOMC Memorandum of Discussion (MOD) suggests several issues that may have
contributed to passive responses to nominal growth gaps.
One possibility is that the FOMC may been optimistic about interest rate elasticities,
selecting policy rate adjustments that were too small to reverse predicted nominal growth
gaps.34 In particular, two procedures could have led to eective overstatement of interest
rate eects:
In framing nal voting choices, FOMC members were free to pick policy rates from
one Bluebook option and monetary target ranges from another option. The problem of
inconsistent choices from an \a la carte menu" was occasionally addressed in Bluebook
presentations.
\The blue book can be viewed as a menu of consistent targets....The Committee is, of
course, free to choose among the various objectives presented, taking due account of
the risks being run. There is the risk, for instance, of choosing incompatible objectives.
However, this risk has to be weighed against the probability there will be errors in
the sta's estimates of relationships likely to prevail among bank reserves, monetary
aggregates, and interest rates." Axilrod, FOMC Economist (MOD, 11/20/72, p.43)
A more direct route to optimistic views of interest rate eects is that projections of
interest rates associated with alternative options were judgmentally adjusted by senior sta.
34The full system interest rate elasticity of the money supply is necessarily greater than the interest rate elasticity
of nominal output if the interest rate elasticity of money demand is also negative.
18Especially after sta models began to overpredict M1 growth in the mid-1970s, there appear
to have been nontrivial downward judgmental adjustments of interest rate changes associated
with alternative money growth paths.
\(Mr. Partee) believed that (interest) rates would be especially high if the rate of growth in
M1 was at the midpoint of the Committee's long-run range....Actually, the econometric
model had yielded still higher rates, but the sta believed the model tended to overstate
rate increases." (MOD, 8/19/75, p.58)
\Mr. Gramley said there was considerable uncertainty about the projections of interest
rates, which were among the most dicult variables to project. As Committee members
knew, the sta tended to make rather large judgmental adjustments to the interest rate
projections produced by the model. In the latest projection,...the model had produced
a short-term interest rate in the fourth quarter of 1976 that was 2-3/4 percentage points
above the sta's judgementally projected rate." (MOD, 9/16/75, p.25)
\In view of recent projection errors of the model, the sta had tended to lower the level
of interest rates it associated with any assumed rate of monetary growth." Axilrod
(MOD, 11/18/75, p.33)
A second interpretation of the eective passivity of policy is that increased uncertainty
about properties of empirical money demand functions after the mid-1970s may have induced
more cautious policy adjustments.
\Shortfalls in M1 growth may also re
ect a weakening of economic activity relative
to sta projections....one option for the Committee to consider is whether it wishes
to await somewhat more sustained weakness in M1 before contemplating a policy that
permits relatively sizeable interest rate declines." Axilrod, FOMC Associate Economist
(MOD, 9/10/74, pp.35)
\In recent years, the Committee had been focusing more on monetary aggregate targets
because of the problems it had experienced earlier with interest rate targets. At present
there would be less risk associated with a reduction in interest rates than, say, 2 months
ago, both because the aggregates had been falling short of the Committee's targets
19and because the economic outlook had weakened considerably. Even so, the precise
consequences of a sharp reduction in interest rates remained unclear. Growth in the
aggregates would be stepped up substantially, but it is hard to say by how much;
and the eects, over time, that the rate reduction would have on expectations and on
spending behavior were highly uncertain. To advocate a prompt, sizeable reduction in
rates was to ignore all such uncertainties." Partee, FOMC Senior Economist (MOD,
12/17/74, p.71)
\The actual stock of money has been running well short of what either our quarterly or
monthly money market models would have predicted for some time, given actual GNP
and interest rates....given uncertainties with respect to the meaning of recent money
supply behavior as well as still unresolved issues aecting the municipal market, the
committee may wish to consider giving somewhat more weight than usual to money
market conditions in framing its instructions." Axilrod, FOMC Economist (MOD,
11/18/75, pp.33-5)
\Mr. Volcker said he felt rather strongly that the right approach to policy today
was to hold interest rates fairly steady....Mr. Axilrod's remarks, which he had found
stimulating and even persuasive, provided a further indication of how little was known
about the short-term relationship between interest rates and the money supply."
(MOD, 11/18/75, p. 39)
\Mr. Axilrod said he felt highly uncertain about the current projection. In particular,
he was not sure whether the demand for money would keep shifting down, stabilize, or
shift back up." (MOD, 3/16/76, p. 60)
\(A)n additional element of uncertainty was introduced by the disparity between the
projections made by the New York sta and those made by the Board sta for the
coming period{with the former showing stronger growth, particularly for M1. Against
that background, this did not seem to him to be an appropriate time for a major
change in policy.....Turning to the specications for the Federal funds rate, he favored
maintaining the present range and keeping the rate at about its current 4-3/4 per cent
level." Volcker (MOD, 3/16/76, pp. 63-4)
20Finally, a third conjecture concerning the framing of policy choices is that dierences
in the underlying relationships and forecast horizons of the short-run policy options of the
Bluebook and of the multiperiod predictions of the Greenbook may have made it dicult for
FOMC deliberations to connect current policy decisions to longer-run predicted outcomes.35
\Mr. MacLaury remarked that he was disturbed by what he perceived as a lack of clarity
in the Committee's methodology. While the Committee now was publicly announcing
its longer-term targets, he has less condence than before in his understanding of the
path by which these objectives were to be achieved....it seemed strange for the blue
book to state that all of the three alternatives it presented were generally consistent
with the 12-month ranges. He believed it made a dierence whether the Committee
embarked on the path indicated by the high alternative or on that indicated by the low
alternative." (MOD, 5/20/75, p.59)
4 Concluding remarks
Recent studies, including Kozicki and Tinsley (forthcoming), indicate that dynamic
properties of empirical macro models are often more realistic if allowance is made for
dierences in perceptions among private and public agents regarding the central bank target
for in
ation. The current paper provides estimates of the target for in
ation implied by
empirical policy response functions, where the real-time conditioning information is based
on Greenbook brieng forecasts presented before FOMC meetings from the 1970s through
the mid-1990s.
In contrast to the assumption of a xed in
ation target, the in
ation target constructions
not only vary considerably over time but are substantially dierent from available survey
35Judgemental adjustments of interest rates associated with alternative policy options, discussed earlier, were
motivated not only by money demand forecast errors in the 1970s but also by dierences among competing sta
models, such as the monthly money market model used in Bluebook analyses and quarterly models used for Greenbook
analyses. \Mr. Gramley replied that the sta's interest rate projections depended on the relationship between growth
in money and growth in nominal GNP. Personal income was used only in the monthly model, because no better
monthly indicators of aggregate expenditures was available....Mr. Axilrod remarked that recent work done by the
Board's sta indicated that in the rst year of recovery interest rate projections based on nominal GNP were too
high while those based on personal income were too low. In making its interest rate projections for the blue book,
the sta had taken those results into account." (MOD, 9/16/75, pp. 32-3) As noted earlier, it is not historically
accurate to assume that all judgemental forecast adjustments were conned to intercept adjustments. Kalchbrenner
and Tinsley (1977) discuss dierences between policy use of auxiliary measurements and use of competing models.
21information on the long-horizon in
ation expectations of private sector agents.
Regarding the conjecture that US in
ation in the 1970s is due largely to central bank
overestimation of potential output or, equivalently, underestimation of the natural rate of
unemployment, there is little evidence that policy responses in the 1970s were directed at
central bank perceptions of expected levels of the unemployment rate and the natural rate
of unemployment.
Of two leading empirical interpretations of the Great In
ation, the passive policy
description is perhaps the most optimistic, as empirical analyses of historical US monetary
policy generally indicate stable policy responses have been maintained since the 1980s. The
natural rate error description has a seductive appeal for central banks for it suggests that
unlucky mistakes were made, but carries also the pessimistic inference that these mistakes
will likely occur in the future. The empirical evidence presented in section 3 indicates that
monetary policy in the 1970s is better represented by money growth intermediate targeting.
This implies that US central bank errors in estimating natural rate gaps for output or the
unemployment rate are largely irrelevant to explanations of the Great In
ation.
The empirical evidence in section 3 also supports the passive policy interpretation, as
adjustments of the central bank policy rate in the 1970s were not suciently vigorous to result
in stable responses to movements in in
ation. However, the passive policy interpretation is
merely a description of unstable policy, not an explanation. A description of the Great
In
ation based on intermediate targeting of money supply growth oers a neglected search
area for explanations of passive policy responses.
Given the advantage of hindsight, there will always be mistakes in the execution of
monetary policy, including errors in estimating current values of conditional equilibria or
natural rates. Perhaps the deeper 
aw of intermediate targeting in the 1970s is that it
obscured the ultimate objectives of policy by shifting the ocial gauge of policy performance
from in
ation and economic activity to the growth rate of the money supply. Empirical
results in this paper support the assessment of Milton Friedman (2003): \The use of the
quantity of money as a target has not been a success."
22Appendix: Specications of time-varying coecients
The eective measurement equation for the policy response equations is
yt = t~ ¯t + at;






where the vector yt contains policy interest rates set at FOMC meetings that reference
Greenbooks generated in quarter t. The matrix of regressors, [ ~ Xt;Xt], conforms to the
dimensions of yt and the parameter vector, ~ ¯t. The matrix Xt contains a unit column vector,
in addition to Greenbook observations on k ¡1 regressors. The ~ ¯t vector is partitioned into
a k£1 xed vector,  ¯, and a ~ k£1 time-varying vector of deviations, ~ ¯t, whose unconditional
mean is zero. The eective time-varying coecients of the forecast model, ¯t, are obtained
by summing the xed and time-varying deviation vectors






where 0k¡~ k is a (k ¡ ~ k) £ 1 zero vector. Note that ~ k < k if the last k ¡ ~ k elements of ¯t are
invariant over time.36 The measurement error is normally distributed, at » N(0;Rt), where
Rt ´ ¾2
aI.
The format of the transition equation is
~ ¯t = ~ ¯t¡1 + et; (12)
where the partitions of the transition matrix and the transition shock vector are
 =
· ~  0
0 Ik
¸






The nonzero transition shocks are also normally distributed, ~ et » N(0; ~ Qt).
Empirical results tabulated in this paper use three dierent specications of time-varying
parameter (tvp) models. Each has appeared in the macro literature, and each amounts
to dierent restrictions on the dimension of the time-varying partition, ~ ¯t, and on the
eigenvalues of the associated transition matrix, ~ :
² random walk intercept (RWI).
² random walk coecients (RWC)
² stationary coecients (SC).
36The matrix ~ Xt is a subset of Xt when ~ k < k.
23The rst specication captures variations in the implied in
ation target through a random
walk intercept. Estimation of the random walk intercept specication uses the Stock-Watson
(1998) median unbiased estimator of the variance of the shocks driving the random walk,
º2¾2
u, where u denotes residuals of the xed coecient regression, y¿ = X¿  ¯.37 Although
means and sampling errors are estimated for the remaining regression coecients,  ¯i;i =
2;:::;k, the xed partition of the random walk intercept is the initial condition, ¯1;t0 =  ¯1.
To provide an approximate comparison with estimates of mean coecients from alternative
specications, the nite sample average of the random walk intercept estimates is reported




^ ¯1;t, along with the standard
deviation of this nite sample average.
Because modest changes in the response to in
ation can imply much larger variations in
the implied in
ation target, the second specication extends the random walk description to
all unrestricted coecients in the policy response equation, using the estimator developed
by Boivin (forthcoming).
Finally, the stationary coecients specication assumes variation in coecients can be
represented by a mean-reverting, rst-order VAR, estimated by maximum likelihood. In the
case of stationary parameters, the steady-state variance of the dependent variable due to
variation in ¯ is
var(y) = ~ XV (¯) ~ X
0;
where elements of the ~ k £ ~ k steady-state covariance of the stationary parameters, V (¯), can
be recovered from the column stack
vecV (¯) = [I~ k2 ¡ ~  ­ ~ ]
¡1vec ~ Q:












~ Xi ~ XjVij]: (14)
Estimation of the three specications is discussed in Kozicki and Tinsley (2005).
37º =
¸
T , where the probability of a zero pileup by maximum likelihood varies inversely with the local-to-zero
parameter, ¸, vid. Stock and Watson (1998, Table 1).
38Equation (14) assigns half of the covariance, Vij, to ¯i and ¯j, following Swamy and Tinsley (1980). Consequently,
some elements of the variance decomposition may be negative under this convention.
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26Table 1: Alternative estimates of unemployment natural rates (%)
natural rate source
policy regime Romer &




Burns1 6.0 3.1 3.9 5.2
70Q1-75Q2
Burns2 6.2 8.2 4.3 5.3
75Q3-78Q1
Miller 6.3 4.6 4.3 5.3
78Q2-79Q2
Volcker 6.1 8.0 5.4 5.6
79Q3-87Q2
Greenspan1 5.7 6.7 5.7 6.2
87Q3-96Q4
Greenspan2 5.2 n.a. 5.0 5.6
96Q1-97Q4
1. Implied by a Phillips equation with backwards-looking in
ation expectations, using Greenbook
forecasts of in
ation and unemployment, Kozicki & Tinsley (2005).
2. Implied by a Phillips equation with both backwards- and forward-looking in
ation expectations,
using Greenbook forecasts, vid. Kozicki and Tinsley (2005).Table 2: Federal Funds Rate Policy Rule,
full sample 1
r¤
t =  ½t +  ¼t + c2;t(¼k
t ¡  ¼t) + c3;t(ut+1 ¡  ut) + c4;tut;
rt = (1 ¡ ¯6;t)r¤
t + ¯5;trt¡1 + ¯6;trt¡1 + at;
= ¯1;t + ¯2;t¼k
t + ¯3;t(ut+1 ¡  ut) + ¯4;tut + ¯5;trt¡1 + ¯6;t(rt¡1 ¡  ½t) +  ½t + at;
 ¼t = ¡¯1;t=(¯2;t + ¯6;t ¡ 1):
tvp format estimated  ¯i
2 estimated  ¼t
 ut, preferred estimate3
 ¯1  ¯2  ¯3  ¯4  ¯5  ¯6 max min
random walk -.002 .149 -.081 -.269 .428 .866 5.6 -4.2
intercept [.99] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00]
random walk -.110 .207 -.084 -.345 .400 .835 805.0 -171.8
coecients [.80] [.36] [.51] [.61] [.45] [.00]
stationary -.150 .249 -.099 -.362 .400 .806 28.0 -30.0
coecients [.07] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 8 49 1 0 0 42
 ub
t, lower bound estimate3
 ¯1  ¯2  ¯3  ¯4  ¯5  ¯6 max min
random walk .009 .141 -.061 -.260 .435 .876 5.2 - 6.0
intercept [.95] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00]
random walk -.083 .199 -.066 -.305 .396 .844 5.1 -50.7
coecients [.87] [.28] [.43] [.62] [.49] [.00]
stationary -.096 .182 -.055 -.283 .412 .859 63.7 -77.1
coecients [.21] [.00] [.01] [.00] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 8 45 1 0 0 46
1. sample 1969Q1-1997Q4; r¡ avg federal funds rate in FOMC meeting-to-meeting intervals; u -
GB unemployment rate forecast; ¼k - GB annualized in
ation, averaged over the forecast periods,
h = -2, -1, 0, 1; k = 1.
2. [:] - p-values;  ¯i¡ sample average of ¯i;t for random walk specications.
3. See footnotes of Table 1.Table 3: Federal Funds Rate Policy Rule
Burns/Miller sample 1
r¤
t =  ½t +  ¼t + c2;t(¼k
t ¡  ¼t) + c3;t(ut+1 ¡  ut) + c4;tut;
rt = (1 ¡ ¯6;t)r¤
t + ¯5;trt¡1 + ¯6;trt¡1 + at;
= ¯1;t + ¯2;t¼k
t + ¯3;t(ut+1 ¡  ut) + ¯4;tut + ¯5;trt¡1 + ¯6;t(rt¡1 ¡  ½t) +  ½t + at;
 ¼t = ¡¯1;t=(¯2;t + ¯6;t ¡ 1):
tvp format estimated  ¯i
2 estimated  ¼t
 ¯1  ¯2  ¯3  ¯4  ¯5  ¯6 max min
random walk .025 .116 -.067 -.229 .532 .893 -.10 -3.7
intercept [.60] [.01] [.09] [.03] [.00] [.00]
random walk .052 .132 -.081 -.240 .521 .879 193 -207
coecients [.77] [.01] [.06] [.08] [.00] [.00]
stationary .017 .120 -.066 -.242 .523 .891 1.1 -9.0
coecients [.90] [.01] [.11] [.03] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 17 42 1 0 0 40
random walk .148 .076 -.057 .604 .908 10.7 6.1
intercept [.00] [.07] [.20] [.00] [.00]
random walk .166 .084 -.058 .584 .899 21.6 8.4
coecients [.38] [.08] [.17] [.00] [.00]
stationary .111 .081 -.048 .606 .908 15.6 8.2
coecients [.41] [.06] [.24] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 23 37 1 0 38
random walk .049 .073 -.208 .551 .920 9.7 6.5
intercept [.31] [.04] [.04] [.00] [.00]
random walk .070 .078 -.204 .545 .914 287 - 16.8
coecients [.61] [.01] [.01] [.00] [.00]
stationary .045 .075 -.209 .545 .920 14.8 6.7
coecients [.74] [.04] [.05] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 19 38 0 0 42
1. sample 1970Q1-1979Q2; r¡ avg federal funds rate in FOMC meeting-to-meeting intervals; ¼k -
GB annualized in
ation forecasts, averaged over the forecast periods, h = -2, -1, 0,1; k =1.
2. [:] - p-values;  ¯i¡ sample average of ¯i;t for random walk specications.Table 4: Federal Funds Rate Policy Rule,
Volcker/Greenspan sample 1
r¤
t =  ½t +  ¼t + c2;t(¼k
t ¡  ¼t) + c3;t(ut+k ¡  ut) + c4;tut;
rt = (1 ¡ ¯6;t)r¤
t + ¯5;trt¡1 + ¯6;trt¡1 + at;
= ¯1;t + ¯2;t¼k
t + ¯3;t(ut+k ¡  ut) + ¯4;tut + ¯5;trt¡1 + ¯6;t(rt¡1 ¡  ½t) +  ½t + at;
 ¼t = ¡¯1;t=(¯2;t + ¯6;t ¡ 1):
tvp format estimated  ¯i
2 estimated  ¼t
¼k - GB forecast average, h = -2, -1, 0,1; k = 1.
 ¯1  ¯2  ¯3  ¯4  ¯5  ¯6 max min
random walk -.159 .222 -.073 -.296 .364 .833 3.5 2.2
intercept [.05] [.00] [.01] [.01] [.00] [.00]
random walk -.170 .234 -.074 -.336 .377 .817 6.3 -31.9
coecients [.47] [.04] [.11] [.43] [.07] [.00]
stationary -.154 .229 -.066 -.286 .406 .819 3.4 3.1
coecients [.20] [.02] [.03] [.09] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 5 58 0 0 0 37
¼k - GB forecast average, h = 0,1,2,3; k = 3.
 ¯1  ¯2  ¯3  ¯4  ¯5  ¯6 max min
random walk -.205 .214 -.050 -.237 .361 .845 4.0 2.7
intercept [.02] [.00] [.08] [.04] [.00] [.00]
random walk -.165 .203 -.046 -.285 .361 .838 69.9 -39.8
coecients [.49] [.02] [.23] [.40] [.07] [.00]
stationary -.149 .194 -.049 -.273 .371 .846 4.0 3.5
coecients [.19] [.00] [.06] [.03] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 14 37 1 0 0 48
1. sample 1979Q3-1997Q4; r¡ avg federal funds rate in FOMC meeting-to-meeting intervals;  ut¡
tvp average expectations.
2. [:] - p-values;  ¯i¡ sample average of ¯i;t for random walk specications.Table 5: Federal Funds Rate Policy Rule,
Burns/Miller sample: money growth targeting 1
r¤
t =  ½t +  ¼t + c2;t(xk
t ¡  xt) + c3;t(ut+1 ¡  ut) + c4;tuk
t;
xk
t ¡  xt = ¼k
t ¡  ¼t ¡ a0uk
t;
rt = (1 ¡ ¯6;t)r¤
t + ¯5;trt¡1 + ¯6;trt¡1 + at;
= ¯1;t + ¯2;txk
t + ¯3;t(ut+k ¡  ut) + ¯4;tuk
t + ¯5;trt¡1 + ¯6;t(rt¡1 ¡  ½t) +  ½t + at;
 ¼t = ¡¯1;t=(¯2;t + ¯6;t ¡ 1):
tvp format estimated  ¯i
2 estimated  ¼t
 ¯1  ¯2  ¯3  ¯4  ¯5  ¯6 max min
random walk .156 .037 -.008 .518 .942 7.5 6.3
intercept [.00] [.03] [.80] [.00] [.00]
random walk .189 .039 -.018 .499 .936 8.5 7.0
coecients [.23] [.07] [.67] [.00] [.00]
stationary .149 .040 -.009 .509 .940 7.8 6.8
coecients [.21] [.02] [.78] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 30 11 2 0 56
random walk .024 .093 .114 .557 .906 27.1 9.4
intercept [.61] [.02] [.12] [.00] [.00]
random walk .040 .102 .130 .540 .894 360 -27
coecients [.82] [.03] [.19] [.00] [.00]
stationary .037 .092 .114 .545 .904 118 7.4
coecients [.78] [.02] [.13] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 16 33 0 0 51
random walk .146 .037 .523 .941 7.1 6.1
intercept [.00] [.03] [.00] [.00]
random walk .169 .038 .511 .937 7.6 6.4
coecients [.27] [.07] [.00] [.00]
stationary .142 .038 .515 .940 7.2 6.5
coecients [.21] [.02] [.00] [.00]
(var decomp %) 32 10 0 58
1. sample 1970Q1-1979Q2; r¡ avg federal funds rate in FOMC meeting-to-meeting intervals;
¼k;uk - GB annualized forecasts, averaged over the forecast periods, h = ¡2;¡1;0;1;k = 1:









1. Coefﬁcients from speciﬁcations in top panel of Table 2, using the natural rate, ¯ ut.
C2(RWI) - c2,t from random walk intercept speciﬁcation, RWI.
C2(RWC) - c2,t from random walk coefﬁcients speciﬁcation, RWC.
C2(SC) - c2,t from stationary coefﬁcients speciﬁcation, SC.










1. Coefﬁcients from speciﬁcations in the bottom panel of Table 3.
C2(RWI) - c2,t from random walk intercept speciﬁcation, RWI.
C2(RWC) - c2,t from random walk coefﬁcients speciﬁcation, RWC.








1. Coefﬁcients from speciﬁcations in the top panel of Table 4.
C2(RWI) - c2,t from random walk intercept speciﬁcation, RWI.
C2(RWC) - c2,t from random walk coefﬁcients speciﬁcation, RWC.
C2(SC) - c2,t from stationary coefﬁcients speciﬁcation, SC.













1. Central bank target - ¯ πt implied by SC speciﬁcation: bottom panel of Table 5 for Burns/Miller
sample and top panel of Table 4 for Volcker/Greenspan sample.
Perceived target - private sector perception, ¯ π
p
t, from Kozicki and Tinsley (2001).
Survey - Hoey survey of 5-10 year expected inﬂation (see text).
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1. R - Federal funds rate; X - 4-qtr avg of the predicted nominal growth proxy, using Greenbook
estimates for forecast periods, h = −2,−1,0,1; (see text).